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UBUNTU: AN AFRICAN EQUITY 
 
TW Bennett* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The end of apartheid and the introduction of a democratic constitution provided the 
occasion for taking South Africa's indigenous systems of customary law more 
seriously. Although early calls to "Africanise" the country's legal system were not 
heeded, one small concession was made to the country's African legal heritage. For 
the first time in the history of South African law, a typically African concept was 
adopted into the general law of the law of the land. This was ubuntu. 
 
In many ways, it has been an exceptional event. Since the colonial conquest of 
Africa, indigenous customary laws have been treated as inferior, scarcely deserving 
recognition as true laws. At best, they were tolerated in terms of such monitoring 
devices as a repugnancy clause.1 There was, of course, a traffic of ideas between 
the two systems, but always from the received Roman-Dutch law to customary law. 
Although South Africa's new constitutional dispensation had the effect of elevating 
customary law to the same status as that of the common law,2 the flow of terms and 
concepts remained unidirectional. The reception of ubuntu into the common law 
reversed this process. 
 
This paper concerns the meaning of ubuntu. Much of the discussion in academic 
circles about the concept has involved a search for its proper meaning, or at least a 
translation that will render the word comprehensible to a wider audience. The most 
obvious translations were the calques3 “humanity", "personhood" or "humaneness",4 
                                            
*  T Bennett. BA LLB (Rhodes) PhD (Cape Town). Professor in the Department of Public Law, 
University of Cape Town. (Thomas.Bennett@uct.ac.za). My grateful thanks are due to Jacques 
Jacobs for his invaluable assistance in preparing this article. 
1
 Which, in South Africa, was formerly s 11(1) of the (now repealed) Black Administration Act 38 of 
1927, and is currently s 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
2
 In terms of s 211(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 which obliged the courts to 
apply customary law when it is 'applicable' and is not contrary to the Constitution or any 
legislation specifically aimed at customary law. 
3
 A calque or translation implies that the meaning is borrowed rather than the foreign word itself, 
which would be a "loanword". 
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but none has been especially helpful. They cannot convey the many connotations in 
ubuntu nor, of course, its cultural implications. 
 
The search for definition has, unfortunately, proceeded on an assumption that 
ubuntu refers to some core abstract concept or an actual way of behaving.5 This 
paper suggests, however, that a better path to understanding ubuntu is to consider 
the ways and contexts in which the word is being used. An analysis of this nature 
assumes that we should pay less attention to predetermined, essentialised meanings 
and more to the way in which past and current users are constructing meanings. 
 
At the outset, we need to be aware that ubuntu is a loanword in English. Such a 
word 
 
is highly susceptible to change, not only because it is novel, but also 
because it is isolated. Its links with the language from which it was borrowed 
are broken, and it has no semantic connections with other words in the 
language into which it has been absorbed.6 
 
As a newcomer in a strange environment, it must fit in with existing legal terms and 
concepts. Even more importantly, it will be exploited by a range of new users to 
serve ends of their own. All of this assumes that the relationship between words, 
their users and meanings is dynamic and changing. 
 
2 Uses of ubuntu 
 
An obvious place at which to start the quest for the meaning of ubuntu is the history 
of its usage. It must be recognised at the outset, however, that it is impossible to 
trace the exact denotation of the word in its vernacular origins. Ubuntu is said, in a 
famous metaphor, to be shrouded in a "kaross of mystery".7 
 
                                                                                                                                       
4 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
5
 Mokgoro 1998 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 15, who says that the Western use of abstractions "defies the 
very essence of the African world-view', which describes ideas through real contexts. 
6 
Ball "Lexis" 182-183. 
7
 Mutwa Indaba 555-556. See also Mokgoro 1998 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 15. 
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Nevertheless, we do know that ubuntu has always been a word in everyday usage.  
It seems first to have been co-opted into a nation-wide public discourse in South 
Africa during the 1920s, when the Zulu cultural movement, Inkatha, used it as a 
slogan in its programme to revive respect for traditional Zulu values.8 From there, 
ubuntu migrated into the discourses of theology and business management, where it 
was used - as cynics put it - to package decision-making in the appearance of 
traditional African values.9 
 
Ubuntu then entered the law in a small but telling "postamble" to the 1993 Interim 
Constitution. The deeply divided society that emerged from apartheid bore a "legacy 
of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge". These divisions were now to "be addressed on 
the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for 
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation".10 With 
no solid legal foundation, apart from this aspirational clause, ubuntu was then 
absorbed into the mainstream of legal discourse by a series of judgments in the 
Constitutional and High Courts. 
 
2.1 Public law 
 
2.1.1 Constitutional law 
 
Ubuntu has played its most prominent role in public law. Not only did the Interim 
Constitution provide the foundation for a new South African society, but it was also 
the first official document to use an African term. The single word ubuntu thus 
provided a gateway for African ideas and values to infuse South African law. In 
Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, and Others,11 for 
example, Froneman J commented that South Africa's participatory democracy, 
although apparently something quite novel, was in fact an ancient principle of 
traditional African methods of government.12 
                                            
8 
Bhengu Ubuntu 10. 
9 
English 1996 SAJHR 645-646. 
10
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
11
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 90 citing 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 121; 
Matatiele Municipality v President of the RSA (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 40. 
12
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 91. 
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Notions of participation and reconciliation were reasons for the success of South 
Africa's constitutional revolution, and a critical institution facilitating this process was 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.13 Ubuntu was expressly referred to in the 
preamble to the Commission's constitutive instrument, the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act.14 When discussing the TRC's extraordinary 
achievements, the Canadian philosopher John Ralston Saul concluded that a strong 
contributory factor was the outlook of the chair, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who had 
"very consciously evoked pre-European African concepts such as Ubuntu" to 
"establish a personal and national sense of justice".15 
 
One of the primary means for securing a political settlement was the amnesty offered 
to perpetrators of apartheid offences, provided that they confessed the truth of their 
deeds.16 
 
By providing the environment in which victims could tell their own stories in 
their own languages, the Commission not only helped to uncover existing 
facts about past abuses, but also assisted in the creation of a narrative truth. 
In so doing, it also sought to contribute to the process of reconciliation by 
ensuring that the truth about the past included the validation of the individual 
subjective experiences of people who had previously been silenced or 
voiceless.17 
 
In AZAPO and Others v TRC and Others,18 however, the applicants argued that the 
removal of civil and criminal liability was unconstitutional and infringed their right of 
access to the courts. The Constitutional Court held that the amnesty procedure had 
been specifically chosen, because without it there would have been no incentive for 
offenders to disclose the truth and, as the truth unfolded, so would the processes of 
reconciliation and reconstruction. The Court noted, further, that amnesty was a 
                                            
13 
The TRC "was conceived as part of the bridge-building process designed to help lead the nation 
away from a deeply divided past to a future founded on the recognition of human rights and 
democracy". (Truth and Reconciliation Commision Report chap 4, 48). 
14
 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
15  
Saul Equilibrium 94. 
16
 In AZAPO v TRC 1996 4 SA 562 (C) 570, the Court noted that "the new dispensation requires 
'reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society'. In order to 
achieve this, according to the post-amble, amnesty is required". 
17 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 112, cited by Albutt v Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 58 per Ngcobo CJ. 
18 
AZAPO v TRC 1996 4 SA 671 (CC). 
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crucial component of the negotiated settlement itself, without which the Constitution 
could not have been enacted. As Mahomed DP (as he then was) observed, the TRC 
sought to "promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which 
transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past".19 
 
2.1.2 Criminal law 
 
While ubuntu was one of the keys to the political settlement, it has played a more 
important, long-term role in the criminal justice system. Here, African ideas of dispute 
resolution had (even earlier) been introduced to a sentencing policy under the label 
of "restorative justice". This concept was also central to the TRC process: although 
those who committed crimes of apartheid deserved punishment, peace and national 
unity dictated reconciliation (which has come to be seen as synonymous with 
restorative justice).20 
 
In this sense, ubuntu made its debut in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
in S v Makwanyane.21 Here the word was given its first full exposition by the courts. 
Mokgoro J held that: 
 
Metaphorically, [ubuntu] expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, 
describing the significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to 
the survival of communities. While it envelops the key values of group 
solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms 
and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and 
morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from 
confrontation to conciliation.22 
 
Justice Langa continued: 
 
It is a culture, which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a person's 
status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and 
acceptance from the members of the community [that] such person happens 
to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a 
                                            
19
 AZAPO v TRC 1996 4 SA 671 (CC) para 677. 
20 
Truth and Reconciliation Commision Report 414 citing Peter Biehl, who describes how ubuntu 
substantiates restorative justice; Gobodo-Madikizela A Human Being Died 127-132. 
21 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). 
22 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
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corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance 
to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility 
and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all.23 
 
Social harmony lies at the heart of ubuntu and, when applied to criminal justice, it 
completely upends the common-law system which, generally speaking, aims at 
retribution. Restorative justice seeks to promote cohesion24 by inducing reconciliation 
between the offender, the victim and the community at large, thereby requiring the 
participation of all interested parties in the proceedings.25 
 
Restoring social harmony is now one of the central aims of South Africa's sentencing 
policy. For example, in M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae),26 which dealt 
with correctional supervision, the court commended the fact that restorative justice 
places crime control in the hands of the community rather than criminal justice 
agencies. As a result, the offender has a better chance of social rehabilitation without 
suffering the negative effects of a prison sentence, loss of a job and possible 
destruction of family networks.27 
 
Reconciliation and restorative justice also feature (predictably perhaps) in the 
reconfiguration of traditional courts. The Traditional Courts Bill, which was tabled on 
9 April 2008, makes much of the need to "affirm the values of the traditional justice 
system, and to align the goals of restorative justice and reconciliation with the 
Constitution".28 The South African Law Commission has also proposed this policy for 
the community tribunals it recommends be established in the townships.29 
 
An even more decisive goal of restorative justice appears in the Child Justice Act.30 
In the "Aims" part of this enactment, a declaration is made to "expand and entrench 
                                            
23 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
24
 On the aim of reconciliation in traditional courts, see Dlamini 1985 Speculum Juris 6 and 
Gluckman Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence 94-97. 
25
 As noted in Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) 
para 60. 
26
 M v S (Centre for Child Law Amicus Curiae) 2007 12 BCLR 1312 (CC) para 63. 
27
 The court cited, in this respect, Pinnock 1995 web.uct.ac.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za; Maepa 2005 
www.iss.co.za. 
28
 Clause 2(a) Traditional Courts Bill B15-2008. 
29
 South African Law Commission 1997 www.justice.gov.za paras 3.45-3.46. 
30
 Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
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the principles of restorative justice in the criminal justice system for children who are 
in conflict with the law, while ensuring their responsibility and accountability for 
crimes committed". Thereafter reconciliation and restorative justice appear 
frequently, as, for instance, in the "Objects of the Act"31 and the policy of diverting 
juvenile offenders from the penal system.32 
 
Ubuntu has made only a brief appearance in the substantive criminal law. S v 
Mandela33 involved a plea of compulsion. The accused, however, could prove no 
immediacy of life-threatening compulsion. The court held that, if lower standards 
were accepted for this defence, too little would be required of people who now live in 
a society based on freedom, dignity, ubuntu and respect for life. It was implicit in the 
idea of ubuntu that every person deserved equal concern and respect. 
 
2.1.3 Administrative law 
 
The porous concepts of administrative justice have given the courts better 
opportunities to invoke ubuntu in this branch of the law. Union of Refugee Women 
and Others v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority and Others,34 
for instance, was a case concerning the refusal to allow refugees from African 
countries to take up employment in the security industry. Sachs J considered a 
blanket refusal to be unfair discrimination.35 In his reference to ubuntu he spoke of 
"[t]he culture of providing hospitality to bereft strangers seeking a fresh and secure 
life for themselves".36 Although these words had been used in relation to homeless 
South Africans, Sachs held that they should be a reminder that we are not islands 
                                            
31
 Section 2(b)(iii) Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
32
 Section 51(g) Child Justice Act 75 of 2008. 
33
 S v Mandela 2001 1 SACR 156 (C). 
34
 Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 145. 
35 
Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 147. 
36 
Citing, in this respect, Hammond-Tooke Roots of Black South Africa 99, who said that, in 
traditional society, "the hospitality universally enjoined towards strangers, [is] captured in the 
Xhosa proverb: Unyawo alunompumlo ('"the foot has no nose"). Strangers, being isolated from 
their kin, and thus defenceless, were particularly under the protection of the chief and were 
accorded special privileges". 
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unto ourselves37 and, on the basis of this metaphor, proceeded to apply the principle 
to the state’s relationship with foreigners.38 
 
The courts have also derived the values of civility and trust from ubuntu. Masetlha v 
President of the RSA and Another,39 for instance, was a case concerning the 
President's termination of the applicant's position as head of the National Intelligence 
Agency. The Constitutional Court held that, although the act of termination was not in 
itself unfair, three ancillary issues were: the due compensation; the manner in which 
the news was publicly communicated;40 and the general public interest.41 The Court 
held that fairness and civility were inseparable from ubuntu. Civility was described 
as: 
 
more than just courtesy or good manners…. It presupposes tolerance for 
those with whom one disagrees and respect for the dignity of those with 
whom one is in dispute. In this sense, civility was connected to ubuntu, and 
was said to be "deeply rooted in traditional culture", and "widely supported 
as a precondition for the good functioning of contemporary democratic 
societies".42 
 
In Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and Others v Tshabalala-Msimang and 
Another NNO; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health and Another,43 
ubuntu was described as a relationship of mutual respect. The case involved an 
urgent application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Cape High Court. 
Harms JA held that the delay was so unreasonable as to be tantamount to a refusal. 
                                            
37 
"Today the concept of human interdependence and burden-sharing in relation to catastrophe is 
associated with the spirit of ubuntu-botho." Here Sachs J cited Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37: "We are not islands unto ourselves. The spirit of 
ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses the whole 
constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying 
motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational 
declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, respect and 
concern." 
38
 Union of Refugee Women v Director: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority 2007 4 SA 
395 (CC) para 150. 
39 
Masetlha v President of the RSA 2008 1 SA 566 (CC). 
40 
Thereby affecting the applicant's reputation as high profile incumbent of a public post. See 
Masetlha v President of the RSA 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 236. 
41
 Masetlha v President of the RSA 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 237: those exercising public power 
should avoid acting in a way that could disturb "public confidence in the integrity of the 
incumbents of these institutions". 
42
 Masetlha v President of the RSA 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) para 238. 
43
 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA) para 38 per Harms JA. 
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He noted a reference by the Judge President of the court a quo to the spirit of ubuntu 
in interpreting statutes, and said that this term 
 
ought to apply to the relationship between courts and the respect required of 
organs of State and courts towards citizens and towards each other... Delays 
in giving judgment give the impression of an imperious judge, and undermine 
public confidence in the judiciary, since "justice delayed is justice denied".44 
 
In similar vein, Koyabe and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others (Lawyers 
for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae)45 again associated ubuntu with a general 
obligation to treat people with respect and dignity, to avoid undue confrontation and, 
more specifically, to give reasons for administrative decisions. The case dealt with 
the removal of residence permits from non-South Africans, and it raised questions 
about just administrative action. Mokgoro J held that declaring a person an illegal 
alien has serious implications, inter alia, being compelled to leave the country and 
thereafter suffering an international stigma that can be used to deny entry into other 
countries.46 In addition, the Judge linked the principles of fairness, accountability and 
transparency with the policy of Batho Pele (meaning "People First" in seSotho), a 
slogan used in local government to indicate that the best interests of the public must 
be put first.47 
 
In Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others48 the Constitutional Court 
also linked fair and respectful administrative action to Batho Pele. Skweyiya J said 
that: "Batho Pele gives practical expression to the constitutional value of ubuntu, 
which embraces the relational nature of rights". Calling upon courts to "move beyond 
the common-law conception of rights as strict boundaries of individual entitlement", 
he remarked in a footnote that Batho Pele indicated an equivalence of "citizen" and 
                                            
44
 Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa v Tshabalala-Msimang; New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister of Health 2005 3 SA 238 (SCA) para 39. 
45
 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae) 2010 4 SA 
327 (CC) per Mokgoro J. 
46
 Hence, the Court said (para 61) that the person concerned would be naturally anxious to know 
why the declaration was made, especially if it had been based on a misunderstanding or 
incorrect information. 
47
 Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for Human Rights as Amicus Curiae) 2010 4 SA 
327 (CC) para 62. The Court referred to Van der Merwe v Taylor 2008 1 SA 1 (CC) para 71. 
48
 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC). 
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"customer" for the purposes of the public service (especially because the customers 
have no choice in service provider).49 
 
Joseph's case concerned termination of the electricity supply to the applicants' 
residence, because the landlord had failed to pay the bills. The applicants sought 
reconnection of the electricity, as well as an order that they were entitled to 
procedural fairness (in the form of notice and an opportunity to make representations 
to the service provider, City Power). As tenants, however, the applicants had no 
contractual nexus with City Power. The Court nonetheless held that the company 
had to comply with the requirement of procedural fairness,50 since 
 
government [must] act in a manner that is responsive, respectful and fair 
when fulfilling its constitutional and statutory obligations. This is of particular 
importance in the delivery of public services at the level of local government. 
Municipalities are, after all, at the forefront of government interaction with 
citizens.51 
 
Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, and Others52 involved 
unfinished business of the TRC, ie a form of amnesty for those who had not 
participated in the process. To that end the President announced a special pardon 
for those who had committed politically motivated offences. The question was 
whether victims were to be given a voice in this special dispensation or not. The 
Constitutional Court held that their participation was essential not only in order to 
establish the truth, but also to achieve the objectives of nation-building and national 
reconciliation.53 
 
The notion of participatory democracy is also an African one. Victim 
participation was the norm in deciding the proper "punishment" for offenders 
in traditional African society…. this remarkable tradition of participation and 
                                            
49
 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 46, fn 39. See the Batho Pele 
Handbook: Department of Public Service and Administration [date unknown] www.dpsa.gov.za.  
See also Cloete and Mokgoro Policies for Public Service Transformation 7-8. 
50
 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 47. 
51
 Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC) para 46. 
52
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC). 
53
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) paras 56, 59 
per Ngcobo CJ. Froneman J noted (para 90) that our constitutional democracy was not merely 
representative, but also participatory (citing Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC) para 121 and Matatiele Municipality v President of the 
RSA (No 2) 2007 6 SA 477 (CC) para 40, a principle that determined even the executive 
function. 
TW BENNETT                                                                          PER / PELJ 2011(14)4 
40 / 351 
 
 
capacity for forgiveness in African society also underlay, at a deeper level, 
the amnesty process.54 
 
Although s 33 of the 1996 Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act55 have formalised administrative decision-making, the technicalities of 
determining administrative action have left significant loopholes. In Fedsure Life 
Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council,56 the Court was concerned 
with budgetary resolutions, which were clearly not "administrative actions", because 
the Council had acted as a legislative body. The Constitutional Court nonetheless 
held that the exercise of public power was subject to a principle of legality.57 
 
This principle provides a new area of discretion and potentially another occasion for 
asserting ubuntu. Legality has subsequently been invoked with regard to the 
President's power to appoint a commission of inquiry,58 prematurely proclaiming a 
statute in force,59 the dismissal of the head of the National Intelligence Agency,60 and 
the exercise of the power of pardon.61 
 
2.2 Private law 
 
2.2.1 Property 
 
Ubuntu has been far less welcome in the field of private law than public law.62 The 
concept has most often been asserted in relation to the Prevention of Illegal 
                                            
54
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) para 91. 
55
 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
56
 Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC). 
57
 Fedsure Life Assurance v Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 
58: "It seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the legislature and 
executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may exercise no power and 
perform no function beyond that conferred upon them by law". In other words, the exercise of 
public power was to be properly sourced in the law: Minister for Justice and Constitutional 
Development v Chonco 2009 6 SA 1 (SCA) para 27. 
58
 President of the RSA v SARFU 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 148. In this context these were implicit 
constitutional constraints. 
59
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: in re President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 
(CC) paras 85, 89, 90. 
60
 Masetlha v President of the RSA 2008 1 SA 566 (CC) paras 78, 81. 
61
 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC) esp paras 68-
69. 
62
 Davis 2008 SAJHR 329. 
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Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (hereafter PIE),63 legislation that 
aims to address the plight of the homeless and those forced to seek shelter on 
property owned by another. In order to achieve a just and equitable settlement, the 
Act requires the courts to consider the lawfulness of the squatters' occupation, their 
interests and their circumstances, together with broader constitutional values. 
Hence, although claims are based on sound legal grounds, they may be refused in 
order to realise higher norms. These have been variously described as justice, 
equity, fairness, grace and compassion.64 
 
The leading case relating to PIE is Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.65 
In response to a petition signed by 1600 people in the neighbourhood, the 
Municipality sought an eviction order against 68 people who, for a number of years, 
had been occupying shacks on privately owned land within the Municipality. Sachs J 
put the Constitutional Court's approach in the following terms: 
 
PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion 
into the formal structures of the law. It is called upon to balance competing 
interests in a principled way and to promote the constitutional vision of a 
caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern.66 
 
The next few sentences are redolent of the language of ubuntu: 
 
The Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The 
spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the 
population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual 
rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of 
Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational 
declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human 
interdependence, respect and concern.67 
 
Sachs J then indicated that, while PIE emphasises justice and equity, these values 
are to be seen as "interactive, complementary and mutually reinforcing" with equality 
                                            
63
 Prevention of Illegal Evictions from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. 
64
 Wine v Zondani 2009 JOL 24358 (SE), citing Port Elizabeth Municipality below. 
65
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). The court approved Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter 2000 2 1074 (SECD), which in 
turn was quoted with approval by Olivier JA in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jikka 2003 1 SA 113 
(SCA) para 65. 
66
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
67
 In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 62 per Jahbay J 
quoting Judge Sachs at para 37. 
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and the rule of law.68 In another context he said that: "[o]ur Constitution requires a 
court ... to weave the elements of humanity and compassion within the fabric of the 
formal structures of the law ... and to promote ... a caring society based on good 
neighbourliness and shared concern". 69 
 
In order to achieve justice and equity, the courts have been obliged to adopt a 
variety of innovative approaches.70 In Transnet t/a Spoornet v Informal Settlers of 
Good Hope and Others,71 for example, the court ordered the applicant to conduct a 
survey so that it could properly assess "the needs and the rights of the persons 
presently illegally occupying the Rail Reserve and the prospect, if any, of relocating 
the communities to a safer and healthier site". 
 
                                            
68
 However, "[t]he necessary reconciliation can only be attempted by a close analysis of the actual 
specifics of each case": City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) 
para 35. 
69
 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA) para 62; Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
70
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 36. 
71 
Transnet t/a Spoornet v Informal Settlers of Good Hope 2001 4 All SA 516 (W) 524. 
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2.2.2 Family law 
 
Aside from the Child Justice Act mentioned earlier, ubuntu has featured in only three 
cases in this branch of the law. The first was Ryland v Edros,72 which concerned 
recognition of a Muslim marriage. Previously, such marriages had been considered 
contrary to South African public policy and boni mores. On the basis of the 
postamble to the Interim Constitution and Langa J's exposition of ubuntu in S v 
Makwanyane and Another,73 however, the court held that the values of equality and 
tolerance demanded a new approach. 
 
In Badenhorst v Badenhorst,74 a married couple’s claim to the husband's parents' 
farm was found to be an abuse of the parents' generosity. The court spoke of the 
wife's claim as "an irresistible temptation of greed", and added that "her attitude 
undermined ubuntu, that godly value with which all human beings are ordained". 
 
Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others,75 a case dealing with the 
constitutionality of the customary law of succession, considered ubuntu in an obiter 
dictum. The Constitutional Court described the valuable features of customary law, 
its inherent flexibility, consensus-seeking in family meetings for the prevention and 
resolution of disputes, the unity of the family structures, the "fostering of co-
operation, a sense of responsibility in and of belonging to its members", and "the 
nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions such as ubuntu".76 
 
2.2.3 Delict 
 
Although the law of delict leaves itself open to ubuntu via such open-ended concepts 
as reasonableness, the duty of care, and the largely discretionary process of 
assessing damages, the concept has had little effect. 
 
                                            
72
 Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (C) 708. 
73
 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
74
 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2005 JOL 13583 (C) para 24. 
75
 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 45. 
76
 Citing Mokgoro J in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) paras 307-8. 
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An opportune moment to assert ubuntu arose in the case of Carmichele v Minister of 
Safety and Security,77 when the court was called upon to determine if the state owed 
the applicant a duty of care. The Constitutional Court, however, did not decide this 
question. It held, instead, that adjustments to the common law should be based on 
an "objective normative value system" reflecting underlying constitutional values,78 
without deciding the content of that value system.79 
 
Dikoko v Mokhatla80 is the only case in which ubuntu played a significant role. Here 
Mokgoro J held that monetary compensation for defamation diverted attention away 
from two basic considerations in this aspect of the law: that the reparation represents 
injury to dignity and reputation, not necessarily to the pocket, and that courts should 
attempt to re-establish a respectful relationship between the parties. An old remedy 
of amende honorable (apology) was therefore revived to acknowledge a sense of 
ubuntu and to emphasise restorative rather than retributive justice. 
 
2.2.4 Contract 
 
Contract, too, has proved resistant to ubuntu, although a possible reception of the 
concept in this area is a more complex matter. It could well be argued that contract 
law already has specific mechanisms to deal with the type of problems which ubuntu 
addresses. 
 
Formerly, one such mechanism was the exceptio doli generalis. This remedy could 
be invoked as a defence to the enforcement of unfair or unconscionable terms in 
contracts.81 In Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas,82 however, the former Appellate 
Division decided that the exceptio did not form part of our law. According to Joubert 
                                            
77
 Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) para 54. 
78
 Davis 2008 SAJHR 321. 
79
 The matter was then referred back to the High Court to reconsider in light of the claimant's 
constitutional rights. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2003 2 SA 656 (C) para 16, 
Chetty J confirmed the "strictly" common-law position on the matter, and then considered the 
effect of the Constitution. He emphasised that the criterion for wrongfulness - the legal 
convictions of the community - was now "to be found in the Constitution and not in some vague 
notion of public sentiment or opinion". See Van der Walt 2003 SAJHR 522-523,525. 
80
 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 69 per Mokgoro J. 
81
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 292-3. 
82
 Bank of Lisbon v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607. 
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JA, it had disappeared in the middle ages and, as a "superfluous defunct 
anachronism", should be laid to rest. 
 
Notwithstanding the elimination of the exceptio doli, the courts still had available 
principles of good faith and public policy, together of course with the Bill of Rights, to 
correct unfair contracts. Good faith has always been a fundamental principle of our 
law,83 but its role is limited.84 In Brisley v Drotsky85 the Supreme Court of Appeal held 
that good faith could not be used as an independent ground for setting aside or 
refusing to enforce contractual provisions. While the abstract idea of bona fides was 
a foundation and justification for legal rules86 and could "perform creative, 
informative and controlling functions through established rules of contract law", it 
could not be used directly to intervene in contractual relationships. The courts should 
refer instead to rules of hard law. In this way, legal certainty could be preserved.87 
 
At first sight, public policy would seem to embrace the ideas of ubuntu and justice, 
for it stands for "the general sense of justice of the community, the boni mores, 
manifested in public opinion".88  And shortly after the Bank of Lisbon case, Sasfin 
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes89 invoked public policy to have a contract declared unenforceable. 
Nevertheless, this principle does not have an unlimited scope of operation. Van der 
Merwe et al contend that "simple justice between man and man" in the parties' 
individual capacities cannot alone determine the public interest, because the idea is 
too simplistic and could lead to arbitrary decisions.90 
 
                                            
83
 Brand 2009 SALJ 73. 
84 
Eerste Nasionaie Bank van Suidelike Afiika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A) 312-31, 
especially the minority judgment of Olivier JA at 323F-326G. 
85 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 16, 22. 
86
 See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Tuckers Land and Development 
Corp v Hovis 1980 1 SA 645 (A). 
87
 South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) para 27. 
88
 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 73. 
89
 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A). 
90
 Van der Merwe Contract 219. 
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Rather than relying on public policy alone to deal with contractual unfairness, the 
courts seem to prefer linking it to the Bill of Rights.91 Thus, in Barkhuizen v Napier ,92 
the court said that: 
 
the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is 
to determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as 
evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of 
Rights. This approach leaves space for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce 
contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional values even 
though the parties may have consented to them.93 
 
In general, the courts' approach to ubuntu in the private law sphere has been 
conservative. Except for PIE related matters, they seem unwilling to incorporate new 
ideas. While mention has been made of ubuntu and/or equity in contract,94 the courts 
have been reluctant to develop these norms any further.95 Davis has therefore 
remarked that principles of legal certainty and private autonomy seem to have 
prevailed over the transformative, communitarian power of the "constitutional values 
of freedom, equality and dignity"96 - a sad reflection on the law that provides ground 
rules for the economic structure of South Africa's fragmented and unequal society.97 
 
3 Objections to ubuntu 
 
Ubuntu sceptics criticise the concept on many grounds. For a start, they say that it is 
too vague to be of any use.98 This objection, however, can be immediately refuted. 
As a metanorm, ubuntu is necessarily generalised. The concept cannot be described 
as a rule or even a principle.99 It has a much broader scope suggesting that it is 
                                            
91
 Christie Law of Contract 16-17. See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 95; 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC); South African Forestry Co Ltd 
v York Timbers 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA). 
92 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 30. 
93
 See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) paras 73, 85. 
94 
See, for example, Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 30; Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa: in re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2000 3 BCLR 241 (CC) para 44; Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 95; Fourie v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA) para 25. 
95
 Cf Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA). See Davis 2008 SAJHR 323. 
96 
Davis 2008 SAJHR 328. 
97
 Van der Walt 2003 SAJHR 539. 
98 
Klug Constituting Democracy 164. 
99 
See also Keevy 2009 Journal for Juridical Science 34-35, who argues that ubuntu is not a 
"philosophy" in the Western sense. 
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closer to a value or, better still, a representation of the right way of living.100 In this 
sense, it is akin to the Hindu notion of dharma.101 
 
It is senseless to object to the ambiguity of such terms, for precision cannot be 
expected of concepts that must play such multifarious roles in society. This point is 
especially true for a legal system such as South Africa's, when the country is in the 
process of forging new values. To demand an exact definition of ubuntu would be to 
impose a premature restriction on its function.102 
 
Another objection claims that the communal ethic of ubuntu denies individual 
autonomy, and that the "appeal to cohesion privileges dangerous hierarchies [and] 
corrupt tribal authorities". Because ubuntu is associated with an African tradition it is 
backward-looking and can have little to offer to the modern world. Drucilla Cornell, 
however, one of the foremost scholars working on dignity jurisprudence, would 
contest these objections on the ground that both ubuntu and the related concept of 
dignity are banners of a high ethical endeavour.103 
 
Whatever the truth of the sceptics' allegations, we need to be aware that we are not 
bound by a single (or traditional) conception of ubuntu. New meanings have been - 
and still are being - shaped by courts and writers, and they are concentrating on 
realising certain values critical to South Africa's changing social order. To this end 
the courts have emphasised such connotations in ubuntu as civility, respect, dignity, 
harmony and compassion, as well as compatibility with the Bill of Rights. 
 
Yet another objection to ubuntu is redundancy. Is ubuntu necessary when we have a 
right to dignity enshrined in the Constitution?104 Indeed, the Constitutional Court has 
often talked of dignity and ubuntu as analogous concepts.105 Any exact correlation, 
                                            
100
 Ramose African Philosophy 40. 
101 
Which can be variously translated as "righteous duty, law, morality or religion":  Menski Hindu 
Law 98. 
102
 Hence Cornell and Van Marle 2005 Afr Hum Rts LJ 205 argue that the generality of ubuntu is its 
strength. 
103
 Cornell 2009 www.isthisseattaken.co.za. 
104
 Section 10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: "Everyone has inherent dignity and 
the right to have their dignity respected and protected". 
105 
See, for example, S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 225: "An outstanding feature of 
ubuntu in a community sense is the value it puts on life and human dignity. The dominant theme 
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however, must be countered. The Western conception of dignity envisages the 
individual as the right-bearer, whereas ubuntu sees the individual as embedded in a 
community.106 Those exploring dignity jurisprudence in South Africa, would concede 
that: 
 
dignity in Ubuntu thinking is not rooted in reason because of an ethical 
concern shared with many feminists that this would deny dignity to too many 
human beings. Thus, such a ground for dignity runs foul of the virtues of 
inclusiveness and acceptance. Instead dignity is rooted first and foremost in 
our singularity and uniqueness, and at the same time in our embeddedness 
as part of a human community.107 
 
4 Ubuntu: a modern African version of equity? 
 
How, then, are we to assess the function of ubuntu in our law? We should be aware 
that it started life as the product of an oral, not a written, culture. The written word 
has the effect of objectifying thought. It distances the word from the speaker, thereby 
facilitating a self-reflective, critical form of analysis characteristic of Western 
philosophy.108 
 
Ubuntu, on the other hand, is a lived system of norms. (This should not be taken to 
imply that it is chaotic, arbitrary or wholly irrational. From what we know of the 
concept, ubuntu is a coherent and reasoned system.)109  t is now being used, 
                                                                                                                                       
of the culture is that the life of another person is at least as valuable as one’s own. Respect for 
the dignity of every person is integral to this concept. During violent conflicts and times when 
violent crime is rife, distraught members of society decry the loss of ubuntu. Thus heinous crimes 
are the antithesis of ubuntu. Treatment that is cruel, inhuman or degrading is bereft of ubuntu". 
106
 Cf Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 34, who reply that dignity can be 
interpreted as "beyond respect in an individualistic sense by incorporating an attitude of 
communality and inclusiveness: in other words, respect for dignity requires one not only to 
respect each member of society, but also to behave with dignity in ensuring that every member is 
given an opportunity to exercise his or her right to dignity to the full". Nevertheless, the authors 
say (at 33) that, although communalism is not unique to ubuntu, "a feature of Western legal 
thought is its use of concepts like rationality, reasonableness and equity and a strong emphasis 
on individualism and on freedom". 
107 
Cornell 2009 www.isthisseattaken.co.za. 
108 
Goodrich Reading the Law 21. The science of jurisprudence is born only when law is written, 
because written texts facilitate reflection and abstract analysis. Professionalism and 
jurisprudence then contribute to the development of a "high-register" language for use in legal 
contexts. This language is marked by differences in vocabulary and structure from the ordinary 
"low-register" variety. See Danet 1980 Law & Soc Rev 465ff; Goody Interface Between Written 
and Oral 263ff. 
109 
It is probably best described as a repertoire of norms, a loose collection of principles and values 
of similar, though varying types. See Comaroff and Roberts Rules and Processes ch 3 (esp 70). 
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however, in a written legal discourse that is working inexorably to shape its meaning. 
What can we now reasonably expect of ubuntu? 
 
The English-law doctrine of equity presents itself as a good indicator. Like equity, 
ubuntu is functioning as a metanorm to correct injustices resulting from the 
application of abstract rules of the common law, or even, on occasion, the Bill of 
Rights. In fact, in Port Elizabeth Municipality Sachs J linked ubuntu to PIE and, 
through that means, to justice and equity. As a result, 
 
[t]he court is called upon to go beyond its normal functions, and to engage in 
active judicial management according to equitable principles of an ongoing, 
stressful and law-governed social process.110 
 
The parallels between ubuntu and equity are compelling. The latter allowed English 
judges discretion to work out fairer results in particular factual scenarios, thereby 
serving as a counterweight to inflexible, albeit certain, rules of the common law. 111 In 
this manner the doctrine of equity was invoked "to regulate the conscience of 
defendants so that they act[ed] with propriety in situations where, by following the 
letter of the common law, they could act unconscionably".112 
 
As the latter quote indicates, the history of equity in English law had a close 
connection with good conscience. In fact, courts of equity were originally presided 
over by the Lord Chancellor, the chief Minister of the King's Court.113 As the number 
of petitions seeking equitable remedies to the Chancellor increased, a separate 
system of courts was created, known as the Courts of Chancery.114 
 
                                            
110
 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 36. He went on to say 
(para 38) that: "The inherited injustices at the macro level will inevitably make it difficult for the 
courts to ensure immediate present-day equity at the micro level. The judiciary cannot of itself 
correct all the systemic unfairness to be found in our society. Yet it can at least soften and 
minimise the degree of injustice and inequity which the eviction of the weaker parties in 
conditions of inequality of necessity entails". 
111
 Hudson Equity and Trusts 5. 
112 
Allen Law in the Making 406-407. See also Westdeutche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC 1996 AC 669. 
113
 During the fourteenth century, the Chancellor's powers expanded to hear matters and make 
decrees on his own authority: Petit Equity 2. 
114 
Hudson Equity and Trusts 12. 
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Early Chancellors - known as “keepers of the King's conscience"115 - were clerics, 
who obviously had a particular knowledge of canon law.116 Hence, the development 
of equity in English law owed much to canon law, which drew, in turn, from the 
principles of natural law, as espoused by St Thomas Aquinas, and even earlier by 
Greek and Roman philosophy.117 The origins of equity in religion have a clear 
resonance with ubuntu, which also finds its ultimate sanction in a spiritual realm: the 
departed ancestors who stand as guardians of the African moral order.118 
 
As it happened, the English doctrine of equity was not received into South African 
law.119 Purists engaged in the bellum juridicum argued that an alien concept such as 
this would pollute Roman-Dutch law. Aside from which, equity was considered the 
unique product of a particular judicial system, with no place in our civil-law system,120 
which was already amply equipped with equitable remedies.121 
 
Indeed, several institutions of Roman-Dutch law played the role of equity: unjust 
enrichment, public policy, good faith, the Bill of Rights (and, formerly, of course, the 
exceptio doli generalis). The rules of enrichment, for example, were there to correct 
situations of injustice caused by strict application of the common law.122 They 
differed from equity, however, in focusing on the specific enrichment of a defendant 
before determining whether it was unjust, and offering mainly compensation as 
opposed to a broader range of equitable remedies.123 
 
Just as the enrichment remedies have a fairly limited role to play in our law, so too 
do good faith and public policy. As we have seen above, in the context of contract, 
their range is not as pervasive as equity.124 Ubuntu, on the other hand, is being used 
to perform functions that go beyond both of the latter concepts. While public policy is 
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 Hudson Equity and Trusts 11. 
116 
Kiralfy Historical Introduction 570; Zweigert and Kötz H Introduction to Comparative Law 194. 
117
 Allen Law in the Making 388ff. 
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Keevy 2009 Journal for Juridical Science 30-32; Bennett and Patrick "Ubuntu" section 3. 
119 
Van der Walt 2003 SAJHR 530. 
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See Christie Law of Contract 521. 
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Douthwaite 1960 Acta Juridica 52. 
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Hudson Equity and Trusts 15. See also Du Plessis 2003-04 Tulane LR 242. 
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Lotz "Enrichment" paras 208, 243. 
124 
Although the argument in favour of good faith is favoured by Zimmermann Law of Obligations fn 
192 at 667. See also Du Plessis 2003-04 Tulane LR 238. 
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informed by ubuntu, the converse is not necessarily true.125 Similarly, although 
ubuntu no doubt contains good faith, it can be realised in situations where the courts 
would refuse to invoke good faith.126 
 
The supreme source of South Africa law, the Bill of Rights, has itself been mediated 
by ubuntu (as in the Port Elizabeth Municipality case).127 Mokgoro J said in S v 
Makwanyane: 
 
These values underlie, first and foremost, the whole idea of adopting a Bill of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a new legal order. They are central to 
the coherence of all the rights entrenched in Chapter 3 - where the right to 
life and the right to respect for and protection of human dignity are embodied 
in sections 9 and 10 respectively.128 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
It therefore seems as if the South African courts have a metanorm, similar to equity. 
If this is the case, we need to take care that we are not too quick to develop ubuntu 
in the same manner as equity. 
 
In 1529 the post of the Chancellor was secularised, after which lawyers began to 
develop equity jurisdiction in the same casuistic manner as the common law.129 
When these decisions came to be regarded as binding precedents - a process 
assisted by publication of the Chancellor's decisions - equity was treated in much the 
same way as the common law.130 It became a self-standing system, with its own 
rules and technicalities.131 
 
                                            
125 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 7 BCLR 691 (CC) para 51. 
126 
In order to achieve simple justice between individuals. Cf Van der Merwe Contract above. 
127 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 37, where Sachs J 
affirmed that the spirit of ubuntu-botho "suffuses the whole constitutional order", combining 
individual rights with a communitarian philosophy and providing "a structured, institutionalised 
and operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human interdependence, 
respect and concern". Previously, with reference to the interim Constitution, Madala J expressed 
similar sentiments: S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 237. 
128 
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 307. 
129
 Zweigert and Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law 195. 
130 
Petit Equity 2. 
131 
Petit Equity 2; Mason 1994 LQR 238-239. See also Zweigert and Kötz Introduction to 
Comparative Law 197. 
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As a result, the doctrine of equity is no longer accepted as a wholly beneficial adjunct 
to the common law.132 Although its strength lies in its flexibility and the possibility of 
achieving justice on a case-by-case basis,133 equity jurisprudence has hardened into 
an institution sharing the same inflexibility as its common-law partner.134 Ironically, it 
can even result in inequitable outcomes.135 
 
We should, therefore, hesitate before defining ubuntu and circumscribing its area of 
operation too soon. If we concede that meaning is not fixed in a primordial past, but 
that it is in the process of being shaped by courts, law-makers and scholars, ubuntu 
may be allowed free play to provide a new set of values and principles for our law. 
 
These values and principles, however, are distinctively African. It must be 
remembered that ubuntu is a "loan word" in English, which suggests that it was 
adopted to signify a phenomenon that was never before expressed in its new 
environment. 
 
A new word is a solution to a problem. Often the need is obvious, but sometimes it is 
unseen or barely felt, and then it is only in finding something to plug the gap that we 
actually realise the gap was there in the first place.136 
 
Ubuntu involves more than entitlements to equal treatment or fair play. It also obliges 
the individual “to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance to each 
member of [the] community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise of rights by 
the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of 
rights by all".137  
 
Keep and Midgley observe that there is "very little in the Bill of Rights that is 
ostensibly "African" or a reflection of African values". The response could be that we 
have "no need to look for such characteristics, for the Bill of Rights reflects universal 
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values and ideals, of which African values form an integral part". All values are 
"essentially the same, even though they might be expressed in different idiom". 
 
Whether embracing a different set of values or simply expressing universal values 
differently, ubuntu is being deployed to give voice to something distinctively African, 
and we may concur with the attempt to incorporate that quality "into the legal system 
so as to form a cohesive, plural, South African legal culture".138 This culture will be 
one characterised by such ideas as reconciliation, sharing, compassion, civility, 
responsibility, trust and harmony. 
                                            
138 
Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-botho" 30. 
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